Are there other takes than "Reasonably programmable literal notation"? Computer Science |
- Are there other takes than "Reasonably programmable literal notation"?
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- Why is autopilot hard to disable?
| Are there other takes than "Reasonably programmable literal notation"? Posted: 15 Mar 2019 08:10 AM PDT I've read the paper "Reasonably programmable literal notation": https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3243631.3236801 by Cyrus Omar, Jonathan Aldrich I would like to know, what earlier or simultaneous "paradigms" are there for this kind of thing? [link] [comments]  |
| A C compiler and VM that lives in the browser, in purely functional C# – Part 1 Posted: 15 Mar 2019 11:03 AM PDT |
| GTC Preview & NVIDIA AI Research Recap Posted: 15 Mar 2019 09:40 AM PDT |
| How To Do Effective Web Development Posted: 15 Mar 2019 06:21 AM PDT |
| Why is autopilot hard to disable? Posted: 15 Mar 2019 07:16 AM PDT Serious question. As a full stack engineer, I understand the complexity and pitfalls of software. No matter how much we spend on formal verification and simulation, there are always surprising bugs. So even in the event of crap autopilot software, why isn't there a big MANUAL OVERRIDE button that bypasses all software and goes directly to the hydraulics? From the discussion around the manuals and training, there appears to be some way to turn off the nosedive "safety feature". But based on the Ethiopian crash, rest their souls, it was either difficult to diagnose in mere seconds which subsystem was at fault and/or how to suppress it. Cockpits are complex, and touchscreens just make the problem worse. Seems like there's a better way to provide critical UX to our pilots. Why not offer a big, obvious lever to bypass ALL electronic components, so that the next glitched flight can be safely grounded? Where hardware poses a significant risk of death and dismemberment, it seems so obvious (to me) that this kind of human intervention would be straightforward and standardized across models. Do commercial airliners really not have this? Or did they implement manual override in a piecemeal, kludgy way? (Yes, in the case of the 737, we recognize that a sensor feeding into the software was an important hardware source of error. The result was an autopilot state that killed the passengers. The source could have been any of myriad subsystems, really, with the same result. And there is not enough time in a crisis to read the entire manual and try to treat every possible source of error. So I ask again, why isn't there a single unified hard switch to turn off any and all autopilot features?) [link] [comments]  |
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